In this paper I argue that the logos, the primary object of knowledge in Heraclitus’ epistemology, is a unity both as an object of knowledge and as an instance of being rather than becoming. Section I begins with discussions of knowledge and Heraclitus’ conception of logos; section II is concerned with knowledge and unity. The two later sections of the paper explore the consequences of the account I attribute to Heraclitus: section III considers being, unity, and change; and section IV (...) discusses Heraclitus’ views of knowledge and sense perception. (shrink)

The Parmenides has long been thought of as one of Plato's more mysterious dialogues. The first part is an attack on the Theory of Forms while the second is an apparently bewildering discussion of the One and the Others. It is the contention of this project that in the Parmenides Plato points out and begins to solve a serious difficulty generated by assumptions about being and the Forms made in the middle period theory. ;The dissertation has three major divisions. In (...) the first, several aspects of the middle period Theory of Forms are examined. It is first shown that his acceptance of the Parmenidean analysis of being, combined with Heraclitean views on change and Socratic assumptions about definitions, leads Plato to separate Forms from particulars. There follow a discussion of a particular interpretation of self-predication with an analysis of its role in the Theory of Forms and an examination of the relation of participation. The first section closes with a discussion of certain problems in the first part of the Parmenides. ;The second part of the thesis discusses the arguments of the First Hypothesis, showing that the middle period claim that a Form, the F-itself, must be only f and can neither be nor become its opposite is so strong as to undermine the theory, since it prevents the application of any predicate to a Form. ;The third section examines the arguments of the Second Hypothesis and shows that in that hypothesis Plato begins to solve the problem posed by the First by introducing participation at the level of the Forms, allowing two types of predication to be applied to Forms. The thesis closes with a discussion of the nature of this new relation of Form-participation and the implications of this new relation for the Theory of Forms. (shrink)

Here is a welcome reminder that not all members of the Academy were Platonists; that the Academy must have been a lively place, full of discussion and disagreement; and that Platonism itself is not monolithic. The focus is, as the title promises, doctrines maintained by two associates of the early Academy: the immanentism of Eudoxus and Speusippus's view that although The One is the first principle, it is not an existent.